College-bound students in Japan undergo a process of intense preparation known as examination hell. An extreme manifestation of examination hell is the ronin phenomenon. Typically thirty percent of students choose the ronin option under which they spend years in addition to high school preparing for the next year's college entrance examinations. Using the mean scores of the entrance examinations as a measure of college quality, I find that college quality significantly improves the internal rate of return (IRR) to college education among the sample of male graduates in Japan. Ronin increases earnings indirectly by improving the quality of the college attended. I also show that the IRR with respect to ronin is one of diminishing returns. On average, the number of ronin years which maximizes the IRR is found to be somewhere between one and two years.
Introduction
In Japan, the high value placed on college prestige leads to intense competition among high school students to enter top colleges. These students undergo a phase termed examination hell in which they cram to prepare for the annual college entrance examinations.
An extreme manifestation of examination hell is the ronin phenomenon. When students are not accepted into the college of choice, they may repeat the process under ronin status. Ronin students spend an additional year, or as many years as it may take to enter the college of their choice, and often attend specialized college entrance preparatory schools. The proportion of students entering college with ronin experience averages about 30 percent, and may even exceed 60 percent among the top colleges.
The incentives of examination hell can only be explained under a system that rewards individuals as a function of college quality. Certain institutions are more preferred than others because they are judged to be of higher quality and improve the economic advancement of their graduates. If college quality didn't matter, then students would be indifferent about which colleges to attend. Competition to enter colleges would equalize across colleges to the point where examination hell would cease to exist, ronin would be considered irrational behavior, and the supplementary education business would go bust. But such scenarios depart from reality. Examination hell intensified and the supplementary education business flourished in the postwar period, and substantial household resources continue to be allocated towards the pursuit of college prestige in Japan.
The considerable investment undertaken in examination hell warrants a cost-benefit investigation to evaluate the investment criteria of college education in Japan. While previous studies have focused primarily on the benefits side (e.g. Ono, 2004a) , the costs associated with examination hell are often overlooked in the literature. As suggested by Prest and Turley (1965) , the advantage of cost-benefit analysis is "that it forces those responsible to quantify costs and benefits as far as possible rather than rest content with vague qualitative judgments or personal hunches… (and) that it has the very valuable by-product of causing questions to be asked … which would otherwise not have been raised" (p.730). The reality is that examination hell is a fact of life and an institutionalized process in Japan. But the obvious question -does examination hell pay off? -remains unanswered. The paucity of empirical research requires an estimation method that quantifies the costs and benefits of examination hell in a unifying framework.
In this paper, I conduct a cost-benefit analysis of college education in Japan using a 1995 representative sample of Japanese male college graduates. I estimate the returns to ronin investments because ronin is a definitive feature of examination hell, and because the costs and benefits associated with ronin can be assessed with relative accuracy with regards to both time and money units. College quality is measured by the mean scores on entrance examinations administered by each college. Central to the analysis is understanding the causal structure underlying ronin, college quality and earnings. If the motive of ronin is to be admitted to a college of higher quality, and an improvement in college quality raises earnings, then the process in which ronin affects earnings must be modeled as a two-stage process. On the other hand, if ronin affects earnings regardless of college quality, then the process can be examined using standard OLS. This paper will examine both possibilities.
Examination hell and the pursuit of college quality in Japan

The examination
In Japan, admission into college requires students to successfully pass the entrance examinations administered by each institution. Examination hell, which refers to students' cramming and preparing in order to pass these examinations, is an expression common to all households with college-bound children. Unlike in Western societies where factors such as high school performance and extracurricular activities are considered in the admission process, college admission in Japan is determined almost entirely by performance in entrance examinations.
1 Hence there is enormous pressure for students to successfully pass the examinations. Although the oft-cited correlation between examination hell and youth suicide is unfounded (Tsukada, 1991) , cramming and other extreme measures are common features of the preparation stage, and continues to attract considerable attention among Western scholars.
For example, Rohlen (1983) writes:
The extent to which some will go in order to prepare is awesome. And the extent to which some parents will encourage or permit the sacrifice of time and money to this undertaking is truly frightening. What Americans regard as the lunatic fringe -students memorizing whole English dictionaries or doing seven hours of preparation a night for a year -actually sets the pace in this sort of competition. (p.106)
The investments undertaken in examination hell are substantial. Many students do not get accepted to the school of their choice on their first attempt. Some 30 percent of these students will continue under ronin status. These ronin students spend additional years preparing for the entrance examinations after high school graduation, often attending specialized college preparatory schools. Figure 1 ). This increase can be explained partly by the second baby boom, and the rise in household income which increased demand for educational services (Blumenthal, 1992) .
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The motivations underlying examination hell can only be explained under a labor market that rewards workers depending on the quality of the college that they attended: If all workers were rewarded equally regardless of college quality, then there would be no incentive to invest in college quality. Hence there is good reason to expect that graduation from the prestigious colleges is linked to higher labor market rewards.
The rankings
In Japan, the issue of who graduated from where is a national obsession. Articles that feature personnel moves among important persons -whether they be in politics, government or the private sector -will be sure to report which schools they graduated from.
As Dore (1973) explains, "it is not so much important to get into a university as important to get to the right university" (p.294). There are numerous publications that rank universities along dimensions of difficulty in admission and successful outcome of their graduates. With respect to the former, the most famous is the annual publication by Obunsha, which ranks Japanese universities by the mean scores of their entrance examination scores. The first column of Table 1 shows the ranking of the top ten Japanese universities according to this scale. The ronin rate is the proportion of incoming students who have at least one year of ronin experience. Because these are the most prestigious and desirable universities in Japan, it is not surprising that the ronin rate among the top schools is significantly higher than the national average of 30 percent. Cappelli and Hamori (2004) shows that the proportion of executives who graduated from an Ivy League institution (as their first degree institution) was 10 percent in 2001.
Empirical studies have also documented the benefits of educational prestige in the Japanese labor market. Graduates of higher-ranking colleges achieve higher earnings (Ono, 2004a) ; they are also more likely to be selected from the labor queue for primary (versus secondary) employment (Sakamoto and Powers, 1995) , to be employed by prestigious firms (Abe, 1997; Higuchi, 1994) , and to reach upper management positions (Ishida, Spilerman, and Su, 1997) .
In sum, college prestige is highly valued in Japan. Clearly the labor market is structured to reward individuals according to college quality. The benefits from graduating prestigious universities are generous enough to motivate students to invest in examination hell. The benefit from college education in any given year of work experience (x) is the difference in earnings between college and high school graduates of the same age expressed as
Total costs and benefits are discounted to the year in which the college graduate enters the labor market at x = 0. The net present value (NPV) of investments in college education is:
where n is the year of work experience when individuals retire. Two interpretations can be derived from the NPV. First, we can estimate NPV using the predetermined market discount rate in place of a in the equation. In this case, the so-called "decision rule" (Willis and Rosen 1979) maintains that college investment is deemed worthwhile if the estimated NPV is positive. And second, we can derive the IRR by setting NPV = 0. Under this formulation, the IRR is the discount rate which sets NPV = 0.
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Ronin is a special case in which the timing of labor market entry is delayed by the number of years spent under ronin status. Consequently, this has the effect of prolonging the period in which costs are incurred, and shortening the duration in which benefits can be accrued, which therefore depresses the IRR, ceteris paribus. The benefits and costs of ronin can be expressed by the following equation:
where r is the number of years spent under ronin status and Y * is the earnings of ronin. 5 In order for the ronin individual to have the same IRR as their non-ronin counterparts, the following condition must hold:
The 'premium' from ronin experience (Y from ronin experience must be greater than or equal to the sum of its discounted costs to be deemed a worthwhile investment. Note that the indirect cost of ronin is now the earnings of college graduates (and not high school graduates). Thus equation (3) points to two important implications: (i) The marginal cost of ronin increases at an increasing rate because foregone earnings become more expensive, and (ii) The pure effect (and not the total effect; see discussion below) of ronin on IRR is negative ceteris paribus, because the cost of ronin is always higher than the cost of no ronin.
The motivations underlying ronin behavior can be summarized as follows:
(i) Individuals invest in ronin because they believe it will improve the quality of the college that they attend.
(ii) The improvement in college quality will subsequently lead to higher payoffs.
The effect of ronin (r) on earnings (Y) is therefore a two-stage process which is mediated through college quality (Q). There is also a third possibility, the direct (or pure) effect of ronin, in which:
(iii) Ronin affects earnings independent of college quality.
The two-stage process can be expressed in functional form as:
The total effect of ronin on earnings is therefore:
The total effect of ronin on earnings is the sum of the direct effect of ronin on earnings requires specifying a system of structural equations. The empirical strategy will be discussed in the methods section.
In equation (5), ∂Y/∂Q is always positive. This has been established by previous studies (see earlier discussion) and I take this as a given. From this it follows that dQ/dr must also be positive. This is the essence of the incentive structure underlying examination hell.
Ronin improves the probability of getting accepted into colleges of higher Q, and higher Q leads to higher earnings. 7 To further illustrate this point, suppose that dQ/dr = 0. Then the benefits of ronin are reduced to its pure effect (∂Y/∂r). This does not imply that the pure effect of ronin must be zero. However, this scenario departs from reality, because it implies that individuals invest in ronin regardless of the quality of the college that they attend.
The IRR can likewise be expressed as a function of Q and r where the total change in IRR with respect to r is:
∂IRR/∂r is the direct (or pure) effect of ronin on IRR (or the effect of r on IRR controlling for Q) which is always negative, because the cost of ronin is always larger than the cost of no ronin. 8 ∂IRR/∂Q is the pure effect of Q on IRR (or the effect of Q on IRR controlling for r)
which is always positive because we know that ∂Y/∂Q > 0. So the indirect effect of r on IRR is dr dQ Q IRR ∂ ∂ which must be positive as long as dQ/dr > 0. This is another way of saying that the benefits of ronin are manifested as an indirect effect vis-à-vis improvements in Q.
Several important implications can be drawn from equation (6). First, if dQ/dr = 0
If r had no impact on Q, then the total effect of r on IRR is simply equal to its pure effect which is always negative. Under this scenario, no individual would have the incentive to invest in ronin. Second, if for some unlikely reason, ∂IRR/∂r > 0, then all individuals will have the incentive to invest in ronin even if dQ/dr = 0. And third, equation (6) can be rewritten in the form of a decision rule which stipulates that ronin is a good investment as long as its benefit outweighs its costs:
Data and methods
The dataset used for the analysis is the 1995 Social Stratification and Mobility categories of colleges due mainly to data limitations. Given our full range of college quality scores, any attempt to collapse colleges into pre-specified categories would be arbitrary.
Moreover, I would lose valuable information in the process, and I avoid doing this.
The reliability of the SSM earnings data as a representative sample of Japanese male workers has been documented by Yano (1998) , who compared the SSM data with actual earnings reported in the Ministry of Labor's publication, Basic Wage Survey. Based on
Mincerian estimation results, Yano shows that the SSM earnings data provide estimates that conform very closely to those obtained from the Basic Wage Survey and suggests that the SSM earnings data are indeed "useful." My estimation results should therefore not be a misrepresentation of the Japanese labor force.
Ronin is not directly reported in the SSM, so the following coding procedure was employed. I assume that college students attend college for four years, and begin working immediately after college graduation. These are not unreasonable assumptions given that repeating a grade in college and taking time off after college graduation are rare occurrences in Japan. Unlike the college system in the U.S. and other Western countries, all college students in Japan must remain in school for at least four years regardless of their performance, and nearly all complete college education in exactly four years. 10 The number of years spent in ronin status is coded as the difference in years between the age at which the individual entered college and the age at which he started working after graduation minus four years.
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This coding procedure resulted in a small number of individuals with ronin years greater than three. For analytical convenience, these individuals were categorized in the ronin 3+ category.
I assume that individuals retire at the age of 60. 12 Expected working life is 38 for graduates who attended four years of college and began working at the age of 22, and 42 for high school graduates. Expected working life for ronin is adjusted accordingly. Benchmark interest rates for IRR evaluation for fiscal year 1995 are provided in Table 2 .
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE Following our previous discussion, the internal rate of return will be estimated for each male college graduate in the SSM survey by solving for IRR in the following equation:
In equation (7), d i is the direct cost associated with college education specific to college graduate i, and Y i,x is his reported annual earnings at x years of work experience.
x h Y , is the experience-earnings profile of the "average" high school graduate, which becomes the indirect cost of college education on the right hand side of equation (7). The costs associated with college and ronin used in the estimations are reported in the Appendix.
Several limitations of my analysis are pointed out as follows. First, I assume that individuals are risk neutral, and undertake investments in human capital with reasonable certainty about their future earnings and employment outcomes. Second, rate of return estimations using cross-sectional data assume a constant experience-education-earnings relationship over time, which may underestimate lifetime earnings by education during periods of economic growth (Cohn and Geske, 1986 ). Third, rates of return are limited to monetary benefits. Non-monetary benefits may include certain non-financial advantages that accrue from college education, e.g. improved sorting in the marriage market through positive assortative mating (Becker, Landes, and Michael, 1977) . I do not account for such benefits due to the difficulty of quantifying their worth. Fourth, I use the self-assessed grade point average (GPA) in ninth grade (= last year of middle school in Japan) as a proxy for individual ability. The usual caveats for self-assessed ability measures apply (see for example Maxwell and Lopus [1994] ). And fifth, the earnings function approach may overstate the returns to education. I control for individual ability to reduce the non-schooling bias (following Griliches and Mason [1972] ), but I cannot rule out the possibility that differences in other non-schooling attributes between high-school and college graduates, or among college graduates of differing college quality may account for some of the differences in the returns to college education.
5.
Ronin, college quality and the internal rate of return: Is ronin a good investment?
I formulate a series of equations to estimate the effects of college quality and ronin on earnings. Table 3 reports the results using OLS. All models control for experience and experience squared but their output is suppressed in the table. The variable for years of education is not included because the current sample concerns only college graduates. I find some evidence of ronin effect on earnings (Column 1), but this effect disappears after controlling for college quality (Column 3). On the other hand, the college quality effect on earnings is positive and significant (Columns 2 and 3). The coefficient for Q in Column 2 is the marginal effect of college quality on earnings, from which we observe that a unit increase in college quality leads to a 1.9 percent increase in earnings. Table 3 . I first estimate the experience-earnings profiles as a function of college quality, at the mean, minimum and maximum values of Q. The earnings profile for high school graduates is illustrated in the graph as a reference category (Figure 2) . The earnings profiles for college graduates show that the payoffs from college quality are generous, and the IRR estimations confirm this (Table 4 ). The IRR ranges from a low of 0.1 percent to a high of 14.0 percent as a function of college quality. The mean IRR of 6.4 percent outperforms the benchmark rates reported in Table 2 and confirms that college education is still a sound investment. The results indicate that an increase in college quality from one standard deviation (about 6.4 points) below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises the IRR to college education from 3.6 to 9.2 percent. The results confirm the significant impact of college quality in Japan.
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A shortcoming of the OLS estimation is that the causal structure underlying ronin, college quality and earnings cannot be properly specified. I next consider an instrumental variables (IV) approach which takes the following form:
where X and Z are vector of covariates that are included in the equations. In equation (8b), ω 3 is now the effect of Q on lnY purged of the stochastic disturbance of ε 4 . By substituting equation (8a) into equation (8b), we obtain the total effect or r on lnY.
Since selection into ronin and into higher and lower quality colleges is not random, two instruments are necessary to answer both questions posed. Individuals pursue higher quality college education because they believe that it will improve their rewards in the future. (Table 5 ). This result may seem counterintuitive, but it is consistent with past findings (see for example, Seiyama and Noguchi, 1984) . Since the competition into college intensifies in high school, supplementary education during elementary school and middle school may not necessarily have the desired effect of improving the chances of successful entry into college. Indeed, many students engage in supplementary education during middle school simply as an "insurance" or because their friends and colleagues did so (Blumenthal, 1992; Rohlen, 1983) .
My analysis suggests that this insurance did not pay off.
The above formulation rests on the assumption that selection into ronin status is a random process. However, individuals choose the ronin option should they decide ex-ante that ronin will improve their future earnings, more so than if they went straight to college. I consider this possibility and estimate a separate equation in order to establish the selection criteria of individual's advancement into ronin status. This equation (hereafter the ronin equation) must incorporate the same variables as specified in the earnings equation, since the variables that determine one's future earnings are the same variables that motivate ronin investments. Predicted ronin status is then entered into the first-stage equation to predict college quality. In this case, I use a binary ronin variable as the outcome -zero for non-ronin and one for any ronin -given the relatively few number of students with ronin experiences of more than one year. The results of the probit equation are reported in the Appendix.
Selection into ronin also requires a valid instrument which is correlated with ronin but not with earnings. Such an instrument may be costs of or access to ronin resources. The instrument chosen for this purpose is the average quality of colleges within the respondent's prefecture of origin (= prefecture in which the respondent resided prior to college entry).
Following Ono (2004b) , I constructed the average college quality variable for each prefecture by taking the average of the examination scores for all colleges located within that prefecture.
The effect of this variable was found to be significant in the ronin equation, but not in the earnings equation. This makes sense because examination hell is likely to be more intense in regions endowed with higher quality colleges, and these regions are also better endowed with "examination hell resources" such as college preparatory schools and other types of supplementary education (Ono 2004b) . Table 5 reports the results of the IV estimations. The first-stage regressions predict college quality given ronin, and the IV (or the second-stage) regressions predict earnings given college quality. First, we find that ronin significantly improves college quality, but at a diminishing rate (Column 1). Column 2 reports the estimation results using predicted ronin.
The results also confirm that ronin boosts college quality. And finally, the IV regressions confirm that college quality significantly improves earnings. Table 6 reports the internal rates of return estimated using the coefficients obtained from Table 5 . The results suggest that ronin is generally a good investment, but subject to the risk of overinvestment. Ronin improves IRR but at a diminishing rate. The optimal investment in ronin -or the years of ronin in which the ronin premium is maximized -is somewhere between one and two years. In comparison to the no-ronin group, the mean IRR is higher among the ronin 1 year and 2 year groups but lower among the ronin 3+ group.
14 The 'premium' from ronin investments -the difference in IRR between the ronin versus the no-ronin group -is therefore positive for the first two years of ronin, but negative for three years and beyond. The IRR using the predicted ronin method (or the binary ronin category) was also estimated substituting ronin = 2 years as the approximate mean years of ronin.
Internal rates of return were found to be 5.1 percent for the non-ronin group, and 6.8 percent for the ronin group. 
Simulations
Using the formulas and coefficients obtained from my analysis, we can apply the decision rule to simulate the change in college quality required from ronin which will make the ronin investment worthwhile, that is: If an individual were to invest in ronin, then what is the increase in college quality (say dQ*) that he must achieve which will make his ronin investment break even? This question can be answered by applying the decision rule and solving for dQ*/dr which sets the ronin premium equal to zero, i.e. we set marginal benefit equal to marginal cost (dIRR/dr = 0), such that equation (6') can be expressed: Figure 3 show the results of the simulations. The actual changes in Q from my previous estimations are reported for reference. Since the current exercise requires discrete units of ronin years, I conduct the analysis using the three category distinction of ronin. The required changes in Q are by definition the break-even points, or the change in Q which sets the ronin premium equal to zero. Therefore, individuals must improve their Q by at least this much in order to make their ronin investment break even. For example, (from Table 7 ) ronin one-year students must improve their Q by at least 2.05 points. Otherwise, their ronin premium will be negative. Since dQ > dQ* for both the ronin one year and two year categories, their ronin premium is positive. illustrates the magnitude of the ronin premium: the larger the distance between the two points the larger the premium. For the ronin 3 year category, dQ < dQ* so the ronin premium is negative. These individuals required an improvement in Q of at least 6.33 points to break even, but their actual improvement was only 5.96, hence resulting in a negative premium.
This is also seen in Figure 3 (a) where the actual change in Q lies below its required change.
From Table 7 , we can see that dQ/dr diminishes as r increases (d where dQ/dr is shown to be concave, dQ*/dr to be convex, and maximization occurs at the point where the distance between the two curves is largest. In other words, while the actual relationship between r and Q is one of diminishing returns, from an investment perspective, it must be one of increasing returns, because the marginal cost curve is upward sloping but the marginal benefit curve is downward sloping. The annual cost of ronin for a student going into his third year of ronin for example, is more 'expensive' than the annual cost of a student who is going into his second year of ronin, because opportunity cost for the former is greater.
Given ∂ 2 IRR/∂r 2 > 0, it follows from equation (9) that d 2 Q*/dr 2 > 0; as students undergo more years of ronin, they must increase their Q at an increasing rate.
A number of simulations can be performed using the decision rule to evaluate the returns to ronin investments. One possibility is to relax the assumption that all individuals retire at the age of 60, and examine the effect of different retirement ages on the IRR.
Alternatively, we may estimate how young an individual could retire and ronin still be worthwhile. We may simulate changes in IRR under different specifications of costs. Such simulations would have valuable implications not only for individuals, but also for educators and policymakers.
Summary and discussion
Examination hell refers to the competitive environment under which students cram and compete to gain entry into the preferred colleges in Japan. Examination hell is motivated by the hierarchical ranking of Japanese colleges, and the generous benefits associated with graduation from the elite institutions. If students are not accepted on their first attempt, they may repeat the process under ronin status, and spend an additional year, or as many years as it may take to enter the college of their choice. The enormous investment undertaken in examination hell warrants a cost-benefit analysis that quantifies the costs and benefits in a unifying framework.
My research clearly shows that graduates from higher quality colleges achieve higher earnings. I find that the internal rate of return (IRR) to college education in Japan varies considerably as a function of college quality, ranging from 0.1 to 14 percent (with mean of 6.4 percent).
On average, examination hell does pay off, when evaluated by the returns to ronin investments. My OLS results show that the direct effect of ronin on earnings is weak. When ronin is modeled using instrumental variables regression, I find that ronin increases earnings indirectly through its improvement in college quality. This makes sense because individuals invest in ronin for the sake of improving the quality of the college that they attend, which subsequently leads to higher earnings. The IRR with respect to ronin peaks somewhere between one and two years of ronin. Hence, ronin is generally a good investment, but subject to the risk of overinvestment.
Although ronin may bestow benefits for individuals, the social implications are not so optimistic. Considering that one-third of the college-bound population undergoes a moratorium of at least one year, the social cost resulting from the lost output is substantial. It is therefore not surprising that the Education Ministry views ronin as a social problem. An extension to the current research would be to investigate the existence and magnitude of the negative externalities associated with the ronin phenomenon. 
Appendix
Estimation of costs associated with college education
The annual direct cost of college education was estimated as tuition minus part-time earnings in 1995 (Ministry of Education statistics). Ronin cost was estimated as the average cost of college preparation schools and other supplementary education expenditures based on data provided by Sakurai (1997) and Stevenson and Baker (1992) . Part-time earnings of ronin students were assumed to be zero since ronin students are assumed to be preparing fulltime for the college entrance examinations, and it is unlikely that these individuals held parttime jobs. Financial aid and scholarships in Japan are rare and were not accounted for in the estimations. A small percentage of students receive some type of financial assistance, but they are only offered in the form of interest-free loans that require repayment (see Japan Student Services Organization homepage for further description: http://www.jasso.go.jp/).
Indirect costs of college education were estimated from the standardized experienceearnings profile for male high-school graduates generated from the following equation (N In recent years, Japanese universities have increased the proportion of students admitted through recommendations (suisen nyugaku) and have started to introduce admissions procedures similar to the U.S. where applicants are evaluated on the basis of their high-school performance and activities. However, these proportions are still small. For example, according to the 1997 Obunsha publication, the proportion of applicants accepted through recommendation at Waseda University and Keio University were 8 percent and 3 percent, respectively. For the 1945 to 1991 cohort of applicants covered in the current study, these proportions are even smaller. Hence, I assume in this study that the majority of the students entered universities through the entrance examinations. 2 Ronin originally refers to a masterless samurai in feudal Japan. In contemporary terms, ronin refers to students who aspire to universities but do not have an affiliation, i.e. they belong to neither high schools nor universities. 3 This proportion was estimated from an unpublished draft of Useem and Karabel (1986) , cited in Ishida (1993) . The proportion of managers and directors from the top 11 institutions is 22.5 percent according to Useem and Karabel's data. 4 From equation (1) it is clear that IRR will vary depending on the value of n, while the costs associated with college are sunk costs incurred over s years and independent of n. However, some individuals may choose to work longer than others (i.e. choose different values of n) so that they can recoup the benefits over a longer time span, thereby offsetting the proportion of benefits over costs. Individuals choose to retire at different ages for various reasons, but it is difficult to account for such individual variations in IRR estimations. Following convention, I assume that n is fixed for all individuals. 5 For simplicity, equation (2) assumes that the annual direct cost associated with ronin is equivalent to college tuition. In reality, the direct cost of ronin such as yobiko (or preparatory school) expenditures are likely to be smaller than tuition. I account for the differences in costs in the internal rate of return estimations (see following section). 6 From equations (1) and (2), we obtain the following equality: 
from which we obtain equation (3) by combining the two terms on the right hand side (note that Y h drops out of the equation). 7 Another way to see this is simply that r and Q are positively correlated, which is consistent with the evidence presented in Table 1 -higher quality colleges have a higher proportion of ronin students. 8 ∂IRR/∂r < 0 does not imply that there are no pure benefits of ronin, but that the costs of ronin outweigh its benefits, if ronin had no effect on Q. 9 The means score of entrance examinations are specific to the college, department of study, and entry year into college. See Ono (2004a Ono ( , 2004b for description of coding procedure. 10 For example, in 1995, 95 percent of college students graduated in exactly four years (Ministry of Education statistics). 11 The SSM survey includes the year and month of the respondents' birth. Because the cutoff date for the new academic year is March 31 in Japan, I sorted the respondents' age of graduation accordingly. I eliminated college graduates from the prewar period because the prewar system of higher education required different durations of middle school, high school and college which will lead to mismeasurement of the IRR. 12 The mandatory retirement age has been raised gradually in response to the aging population. In 1995, 80 percent of Japanese firms set the mandatory retirement at age 60. In 2000, this proportion was 92 percent (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare statistics). 13 One should be reminded that interest rates in Japan have declined precipitously in the 1990s to reach an unprecedented low in recent years. Hence, the 1995 figures may not be the best investment criterion. 14 For analytical convenience, I estimate the IRR for the ronin 3+ group assuming ronin years to be 3. Diamond, 1998 ] c [SOURCE: Toyo Keizai data, reprinted from Kawaijuku, 1996] 
